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INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES AND PERCEIVED TENSION BETWEEN CLASSES      
IN CONTEMPORARY URBAN CHINA: EVIDENCE FROM SURVEY DATA 
Xi Zhang, M.A. 
University of Pittsburgh, 2006 
 
This thesis studies the perceived tension between classes in contemporary urban China 
using the 1992 urban survey data.  By investigating people’s class identification and perceived 
class tension, I find that middle class identification exists widely in urban Chinese society and 
the perceived class tension is not strong enough to threaten the existing political regime and 
social stability, or to push further reforms and the progress of democratization.  My findings 
provide some explanations to the two puzzles that have confused researchers of China studies: 
persistence of non-democratic political institutions despite robust economic development, and 
persistence of regime stability despite increasing social inequality. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The past nearly thirty years have witnessed the so-called “second social revolution” in 
China (Harding 1987), equal in significance to the 1949 communist revolution and reflecting 
fundamental shifts in the nation’s economic and political life.  In general, the post-1978 reforms 
have been very successful, considering China’s considerable success in attracting foreign 
investment, selling Chinese goods abroad, sustaining high economic growth rates, improving 
popular living standards, and generating increased non-agricultural employments.  However, this 
dramatic social transition from a central-planned economy to a market-oriented one has revealed 
several puzzles to the scholars in China studies.  As one of such scholars, So (2003) sees that 
there are puzzles of the lack of impetus towards democratization and the lack of working class 
struggle, which I will further elaborate as below and attempt to explain by drawing empirical 
evidence later in this thesis. 
First, So (2003) puts forward that there is the puzzle of little progress toward 
democratization.  According to the “market transition” theory, economic reforms will create their 
own liberating effects, leading to the expansion of private sectors and middle class, the 
strengthening of civil society, and the transition from authoritarianism to democracy.  However, 
despite the surprisingly high growth rates of Chinese economy, there have been little sign of 
another democratic movement in China after the rigorous Tiananmen demonstration in 1989.  
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Then, what factors could account for the persistence of non-democratic institutions in China 
despite its robust economic development?  
So (2003) posts the second puzzle to question the relationship between social inequality 
and stability.  According to the conflict theory founded by Marx and developed by later theorists 
such as Lukacs, the existence and increasing social inequality provides the key to social unrest 
and threats to the regime.  In the Chinese context, the groups of people who get hurt by the 
reforms would respond through various protests, demonstrations, or strikes, which may get 
translated into social or political movements that could possibly threaten the stability of the 
existing regime.  The economic reforms in China have produced a large number of winners such 
as private business owners or entrepreneurs as well as losers such as layoff workers.  And the 
transition of the distributive system, from an egalitarian redistributive system to a liberalistic 
“distribution according to the contribution by resources to wealth creation,”1 has given birth to 
the widespread and increasing income inequality2.  Considering such problems, some scholars 
assert that China has been facing growing unrest that may threaten the stability of the current 
regime.  As one of such scholars, He (2003:71) even claimed that “Chinese society currently 
resembles a volcano on the verge of eruption.”  However, we notice that China has had sustained 
economic growth under a fairly stable society despite the increasing unrest and income 
inequality.  In spite of the rising tide of public protests in China since the 1990s, there have been 
little sign of a demonstration which attempts to overthrow the existing regime or social system.  
Then, what explains the lack of social instability in Chinese society and how accurate is the 
assessment of China as a society on the “verge of a volcanic eruption?” 
                                                 
1 Deng Xiaoping put forward this slogan and similar ones like “let a part of people be enriched before others” in 
order to arouse people’s enthusiasm for production and wealth creation. 
2 The disparity between rich and poor is increasing, and the Gini coefficient has risen already from 0.2 in 1978 to 
0.523 in 1995 (Zhu, Fan and Yan 2003).  
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This thesis is concerned with both these puzzles as they apply to 1990s China.  To shed 
some light on the puzzles, instead of doing a stratification analysis on the impact of market 
reforms on Chinese society following the majority of the existing literature3 , I analyze the 
contemporary Chinese stratification from a class analysis viewpoint since it is considered to be 
an important method for sociological studies4.  In the case of China studies, a stratification 
researcher may look into the trend in social inequality and changing stratification mechanisms in 
terms of occupation, income, education, life style, social status and so on, while a class analyst 
would go further to examine how social stratification, social fragmentation, or social polarization 
is related to class formation, class differentiation, class identification, class relation as well as 
their impacts in the transitional society. 
It is well-known that after the 1949 communist revolution, Chinese society transformed 
from a class-divided society to a so-called “classless” society ruled by the Leninist party-state.  
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) carried out several socialist projects to eliminate the 
economic foundations of some classes, such as the land reform, the collectivization program, the 
nationalization program, the Hundred Flower Campaign, etc.  As So (2003:365) documents, “the 
CCP used the land reform program to dissolve the economic foundation of the landlord class, the 
collectivization program to dissolve the economic foundation of the rich peasant class, the 
nationalization program to dissolve the economic foundation of the capitalist class, the Hundred 
Flower Campaign to dissolve the economic foundation of the new middle class intellectual.”   
After Deng Xiaoping took power in the late 1970s, he and his colleagues carried out the 
reform-open policy and replaced Mao’s project with the Four Modernizations.  This leads to the 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Parish 1981, 1984; Whyte 1985, 1986; Lin and Xie 1988; Nee 1989, 1991, 1992, 1996; Blau and 
Ruan 1990; Walder 1990, 1992, 1995, 1996; Lin and Bian 1991; Bian 1994, 1996; Lin 1995, 2000; Bian and Logan 
1996; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; Xie and Hannum 1996; Zhou, Tuma & Moen 1996, 1997; Zhou 2000; Tang and 
Parish 2000. 
4 See, for example, E.P. Thompson, Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, Erik Wright, and Michael Burawoy. 
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creation of a mixed economy (state-owned, collective and private), which laid the economic 
foundations for the reemergence of some “new” social classes in the post-1978 transitional 
period.  As So (2003:366) notes, “Decollectivization has recreated a rich peasant class in the 
countryside.  The expansion of the private sector has given rise to an old middle class (petty-
bourgeoisie getihu employing less than ten workers) and to a capitalist class (entrepreneurs 
employing ten workers or more).  Decentralization, enterprise reforms, and the success of 
township enterprises have greatly expanded the size of the new middle class (corporate 
professionals such as mid-level managers and accountants).  The expansion of high education 
institutions and service sector has greatly expanded the size of another segment of the new 
middle class (intellectuals or service professionals such as teachers and journalists).  The 
recreation of the labor market means that the working class now needs to sell its labor to the 
market for a living.”  These dramatic changes potentially entail a rapid class differentiation or 
even a class polarization, associated with escalating class antagonism in Chinese society. 
Based on the changing mechanism of social classes in China, this thesis argues that some 
special characteristics of China’s development could be understood through examining the 
reconstruction of classes and people’s perception about classes in the reform era.  Several 
questions which this thesis attempts to answer are as following: During the post-1978 reform era, 
several new classes have reemerged since the reestablishment of their economic foundations, 
then do class awareness and perceived tension between classes also appear along with this 
process, and if so, in what fashion are they manifested? What factors account for such awareness 
and perception? Which strata of the population make the major contribution? In what way such 
psychology affects democratization, social stability, reform process, and other prevailing 
attitudes and beliefs? Using the 1992 China Urban Survey conducted by the Economic System 
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Reform Institute of China, I will empirically explore the nature of class awareness and perceived 
class tension, outline their causal antecedents, and demonstrate their social impacts on mass 
political attitudes and beliefs, thereafter, on a series of democratic values.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Social stratification and social class are the two concepts which are always blurred for 
some reason.  Sometimes they are considered the same and used interchangeably.  Sometimes 
social class is considered as one form of social stratification.  However, many scholars are 
conscious of the differences and ambiguities between these two concepts and use them 
separately.  Two important early studies of this kind are those of Sorokin (1927) with respect to 
social stratification, and those of Centers (1949) regarding the psychology of social class and the 
nature of American class structure.  Thus, before I start to report my empirical findings, it is 
necessary to clarify the meanings of these two concepts and the distinctions between them based 
on early works.  The theoretical framework of this thesis adopts the principle that social 
stratification and social class are partly overlapped but different in the sense that the former 
emphasizes the objective classification while the latter emphasizes the psychological 
differentiation.   
2.1.1. Social Stratification 
Social stratification is at the heart of macro-sociology, that is, the study of the whole 
society on a comparative basis.  According to Sorokin (1927), social stratification means “the 
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differentiation of a given population into hierarchically superposed classes.  It is manifested in 
the existence of upper and lower social layers.  Its basis and very existence consist in an unequal 
distribution of rights and privileges, duties and responsibilities, social values and privations, 
social power and influence among the members of a society.” 
In fact, there are various forms of social stratification in modern societies and Sorokin 
(1927) believes that the majorities of these can be reduced to three principle types: the economic, 
political and occupational.  Sorokin (1927) regards economic stratification as the social position 
based on a group’s wealth and income status in a society, which includes both the amount of 
wealth and income and the sources of them.  Political stratification means that “the social ranks 
within a group are hierarchically superposed with respect to their authority and prestige, their 
honors and titles;” in other words, there are the rulers and the ruled within a group.  Occupational 
stratification exists “if the members of a society are differentiated into various occupational 
groups and some of these occupations are regarded as more honorable than others,” or “if the 
members of an occupational group are divided into bosses of different authority and into 
members who are subordinated to the bosses.”  But among all the criteria, occupation seems 
generally as “the most satisfactory single index to study the distribution of social strata and the 
attitudes of corresponding strata, probably because it is more objective than economic status 
(which depends to a certain extent on a rater’s judgment) and is more easily and reliably 
ascertained than income” (Centers 1949:15).   
From the above descriptions, we can see that social stratification refers to the 
differentiation of people into hierarchical social categories based on some objective criteria, 
mainly occupational, political, economic status.  We notice in sociological literature, the term 
stratification is usually associated with studies of social inequality (e.g., income inequality).  
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However, it is inappropriate to use social stratification as a single indicator to link to people’s 
attitudes, beliefs, values, behaviors or acts, since it is simply an objective differentiation, rather 
than a subjective or psychological one which may conceptually form some values or beliefs 
within cohesive groups.  In other words, social stratification is a purely nominal classification of 
social groups or social positions and therefore usually used as an analytic tool for empirical 
researchers.  Importantly, the social strata generated from socioeconomic stratification analysis 
are not necessarily social classes, which I will explain below. 
2.1.2. Social Class 
The concept of social class is perhaps the most debatable in modern sociology.  We see 
various and numerous definitions or interpretations of social class.  But the starting point of 
discussions of class undoubtedly should go back to Marx.  Generally recognized as the founder 
of the conflict theory, Marx stresses the role that class and class conflict play in social 
movements and social changes.  The core of Marxian theory is the idea that exploitation and 
inequality based on the ownership versus non-ownership relationship generate antagonistic 
interests which result in class consciousness and class conflict as forces for revolutionary social 
changes.   
In Marxian account, a class in its objective sense is the aggregate of people standing in 
the same economic position with respect to ownership or non-ownership of the means of 
production in a society.  In the most simplified form, there are two great classes, namely, the 
bourgeoisie and the proletariat.  The subjective or psychological aspect of a class is associated 
with the idea of class consciousness, describing how the feeling of membership and possession 
of common interests are translated into collective action.  In particular, when the members of the 
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proletariat become aware of their common social position and common interests rooted in the 
process of production and exchange, class conflict and class struggle take into place and 
eventually they will lead to revolutionary practical actions and social changes.  To describe this 
psychological transformation process of the proletariat class, Marx depicts two stages: a “class 
in itself,” aggregate of people who have a common relation to the means of production but are 
not yet conscious of their common interests and common social position; a “class for itself,” a 
class of people who are already conscious of their common social situation and engage in active 
pursuit of their common interests. 
Distinguished from social strata, social classes can be regarded as socioeconomic but 
essentially psychological groupings.  One may think of a person based on his or her 
socioeconomic conditions.  But to fully understand that person’s behavioral orientations, one 
should go further to examine his or her psychology.  The feeling of belongingness to or 
identification with a class may lead him or her to think and act in a common way with others in 
the same class to pursue their common interests through political representation.  That is to say, 
subjective belongingness to a class may form a crucial part of a person’s frame of reference for 
social behaviors.  Nevertheless, in the process of self-identification, it is not always true that the 
class a person should belong to based on his or her socioeconomic attributes is the same as the 
one he or she really feels to belong to, and this links to Marxian concept of false consciousness.  
This is why class lines of cleavage based on subjective identification may not always conform to 
the stratum lines of cleavage based on objective socioeconomic stratification. 
Unfortunately, Marx’ definition of class based on property ownership has becoming 
problematic and unrealistic in modern societies.  The simplified cleavage between capitalist class 
(owners of the means of production) and working class (labor sellers) cannot explain the conflict 
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and inequality within the employed labor market.  For example, different types of workers (e.g., 
business managers, professionals) emerged along with the transition towards post-industrial 
societies, who do not well fit the Marxian category of proletarian and obviously do not share 
common interests with traditionally defined working class.  Therefore, to understand an 
individual’s attitudes, values, and beliefs shared with some others in the society, it is important 
and necessary to combine the subjective or psychological aspect of social class based on the 
Marxian account with the objective criteria (e.g., occupation) widely used in existing 
socioeconomic stratification research.   
2.2. RELATED LITERATURE 
Social stratification and social inequality in Chinese society have drawn the world’s 
attention for a long time.  Scholars have been involved in lively debates about China’s changing 
mechanisms of social stratification during the transition from a central-planned economy toward 
a market economy (e.g., Parish 1981, 1984; Whyte 1985, 1986; Lin and Xie 1988; Nee 1989, 
1991, 1992, 1996; Blau and Ruan 1990; Walder 1990, 1992, 1995, 1996; Lin and Bian 1991; 
Bian 1994, 1996; Lin 1995, 2000; Bian and Logan 1996; Szelenyi and Kostello 1996; Xie and 
Hannum 1996; Zhou, Tuma & Moen 1996, 1997; Zhou 2000; Tang and Parish 2000).  The 
majority of the existing literature offers a social stratification analysis of the impacts of 
markertization on Chinese society.  In particular, they examine the effects of institutional 
changes – e.g., the shift from redistribution to market – on altering the mechanisms of 
stratification.   
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The “market transition” theory proposed by Nee (1989, 1991, 1992, 1996) is an earliest 
attempt to link the institutional changes in the market transitional process and the changes in the 
social stratification order.  Nee (1996:910) argues that the shifts of power from socialist 
redistributive institutions to market institutions will bring different logics of resource allocation, 
so “there will be a change in the distribution of rewards favoring those who hold market rather 
than distributive power.”  In the new mechanisms of resource allocation, the direct producers are 
more likely to gain bargaining power and dominant advantage than the redistributors.  The 
emergence and growth of market institutions lead to “a decline in the significance of socialist 
redistributive power even in the absence of fundamental change in the political order” (Ibid.).  
Consequently, the shift from a redistributive economy to a market economy causes changes in 
opportunity structure for gain and profit, changes in mechanisms of resource allocation, and 
finally changes in social stratification order. 
After Nee’s theories came out, other scholars have developed several alternative 
explanations, including arguments emphasizing the increasing role of local governments (Walder 
1995), the persistence of old redistributive power and growth of new market power (Bian and 
Logan 1996), the continuity of old technocratic political power (Rona-Tas 1994), the evolution 
of “political markets” on a level playing field (Parish and Michelson 1996), the path dependence 
of reforms (Stark 1992), and the maintenance of both old bureaucratic and new market 
advantages (Zhou et al. 1997).  Although they differ in emphases, these arguments share the 
main idea that during the transformation process from a central controlled economy to a market 
economy, the persistence of existing political institutions maintain the power of redistributors 
and administrators, so they can secure more benefits and profits for themselves; on the other 
hand, the emerging economic institutions increase the bargaining power of direct producers, so 
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they can also reap greater economic rewards than before.  In short, the market transformation 
allows multiple winners.   
The debate between the “market transition” theory and the other theoretical arguments is 
on whether the power of state managers has been eroded by market forces, and whether human 
capital, social network, and entrepreneurship have induced new forms of stratification and 
inequality as economic reforms progress.  This market transition debate has made a significant 
contribution to the literature of market reforms, social stratification and inequality in Chinese 
society.  However, most of the scholars involved in the debate have adopted objective measures 
to detect the changes in economic institutions during transitional process.  In particular, income5 
is one of the most commonly used indicators of economic benefits associated with positions, and 
most empirical studies thus have examined patterns of income inequality and how it relates to 
various social issues.  Except for a couple of scholars, there seems little effort to analyze the 
contemporary Chinese stratification from a subjective perspective, in particular, a class analysis 
viewpoint.  The literature on market transition has so far avoided raising the issues of classes in 
its analysis (So 2003).  The lack of class analysis in this field is unfortunate, because class 
analysis has proved to be an important method in sociology.  The works of E. P. Thompson, 
Barrington Moore, Theda Skocpol, Erik Wright, and Michael Burawoy have used class analysis 
to examine the origins of dictatorship or democracy, revolutions, and socialist transformation 
from state socialism to capitalism in the Eastern Europe.  As stated in the theoretical section, 
stratification is merely a descriptive term for analyzing the existence of high and low hierarchical 
ranks in a society, while class can be regarded as an essentially psychological phenomenon in the 
fullest sense of the term.  Thus, bringing class analysis back into the Chinese market transition 
                                                 
5 Beside the indicator of income, latent and non-monetary resources distributed through workplaces and other 
channels also began to attract the attention of scholars. See, for example, Oberschall 1996; Walder 1992; Zhou et al. 
1997. 
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literature would open up new research questions and provide new perspectives for understanding 
the continuity and transformation of Chinese society in the second half of the twentieth century.   
Therefore, to provide some explanations for the puzzles presented in the introduction 
section, that is, the lack of democratic progress during the period of market transition and 
economic development, and the counter-intuitive co-existence of both social inequality and 
social stability, this thesis uses 1992 survey data to empirically explore these puzzles and analyze 
social stratification, class identification, perceived class tension and their impacts on people’s 
values, beliefs, and attitudes in the post-Mao Chinese urban society.   
 13
3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.1. DERIVED HYPOTHESES  
In most of the existing studies of social stratification, one of the main hypotheses is that 
class identification or class awareness, which is determined by economic and social ascriptions, 
will influence people’s beliefs and practices.  This logic of social action is driven by the common 
interests shared by a class.  Thus, in the empirical parts of this thesis, the first step is to identify 
the patterns of social stratification based on occupational composition 6 , and how it affects 
people’s perceived class tension and their class identification during the transitional period in 
urban China.  As we know, the transformation from a redistributive economy to a market 
economy has produced numerous winners and losers.  People who do not have the necessary 
survival skills or the knowledge of new market rules (versus old socialist rules) feel their social 
status and even basic livelihood threatened.  And according to the classical Marxian class theory, 
the inequality between classes will result in antagonistic interests that generate tension or 
conflict.  Along with the processes of industrialization and urbanization, the “exploited” class 
will be more aware of their common experience and interests which provide the key to social 
changes.  Applying this theory to China’s market reform context offers the initial basis for the 
first two hypotheses. 
                                                 
6 As noted in the theoretical section, “occupation seems generally agreed upon as the most satisfactory single index, 
probably because it is more objective than economic status (which depends to a certain extent on a rater’s judgment) 
and is more easily and reliably ascertained than income” (Center 1949:15).  
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Hypothesis 1: The groups who gain from the reforms are more likely to identify themselves with 
higher classes than the groups who lose from the reforms. 
Hypothesis 2: The groups who gain from the reforms perceive less class tension than the groups 
who lose from the reforms. 
Correspondingly, I propose the next hypothesis as: 
Hypothesis 3: The groups who identify themselves with higher classes perceive less class tension 
than the groups who identify themselves with lower classes. 
Nee’s (1989, 1991, 1992, 1996) “market transition” theory has clarified our 
understanding of the question of who gains and who loses during the reforms, especially when it 
is applied to China’s rural sectors.  He argues that, the market transitions shift power and 
privilege from redistributors to direct producers, and create larger gains and rewards to the latter.  
As Bian and Logan (1996) note, several implications could be generated from Nee’s theory, 
which include 1) the decline of the redistributive political power; 2) the increase of the rewards 
of market direct producers, in other words, people who directly participate in the market (e.g., 
entrepreneurs, private business owners) will have higher rewards than who do not; 3) the 
increase of the returns on human capital (e.g., education, training, work experience, talent, 
entrepreneurship, hard work, innovations).   
Administrators and resource redistributors used to secure great benefits and privilege for 
themselves and their families during the state socialist era.  If the “market transition” theory has 
a bite, this kind of redistributive power should decline during the market reforms and people who 
are closer to the market should gradually believe that they could also gain benefits and privilege 
and improve their social status through individual initiative and effort in the market economy.  
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Based on this argument and the predictions of Hypothesis 1 and 2, I generate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: The groups who perceive more class tension or who identify themselves with lower 
classes are less likely to attribute personal success to individual effort. 
Following up the “market transition” theory, it is argued that the rapid economic 
development will lead to the expansion of private sectors, the expansion of a cosmopolitan 
middle class, the strengthening of civil society, and the transition from authoritatirianism to 
democracy in China’s reform era (So 2003).  However, as mentioned in the first puzzle, despite 
the surprisingly high growth rates of the Chinese economy, there have been little sign of a 
democratic breakthrough in China after the rigorous democratic movement in 1989.  Then, if we 
are not able to find much evidence from the “objective” social phenomenon to explain the 
persistence of non-democratic institutions, is it possible to find some explanations from people’s 
“subjective” democratic values and attitudes? In this thesis, I specifically look at people’s values 
of political participation and interest expression.  Therefore, I have the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: The groups who perceive more class tension or who identify themselves with lower 
classes are more likely to hold certain political participatory values and attitudes. 
Finally, considering the second puzzle, we need to find out some explanations for the 
lack of social instability and threats to the existing regime despite the increasing inequality in 
China and examine how accurate is the assessment of China as a society on the “verge of a 
volcanic eruption.”  In order to do that, again I use a class analysis perspective in terms of 
people’s “subjective” feeling, which leads to the following hypothesis. 
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Hypothesis 6: The groups who perceive more class tension or who identify themselves with lower 
classes are less likely to possess feeling of fairness of the social system and satisfaction of the 
reforms.    
3.2. DESCRIPTION OF THE SURVEY DATA 
Survey data are used to test the above hypotheses.  For this paper, I use data from a 
national urban survey conducted in June 1992 by the Economic System Reform Institute of 
China, which consists of 2395 respondents in 44 cities and 26 provinces.  It provides lots of 
details on specific responses to reform and related attitudes.  The data set was provided by 
Professor Wenfang Tang7 at University of Pittsburgh.   
As we know, Deng Xiaoping’s southern tour in early 1992 was a turning point in China’s 
stagnation after the 1989 Tiananmen movement.  Deng’s southern tour and his speech marked 
the intensification of the market reforms and promoted China’s return to the path of steady 
economic development.  Therefore, it is meaningful to see the public response to this newly-
revived atmosphere by examining the survey conducted in the summer of 1992, several months 
after Deng’s southern tour. 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 For further information, see Tang and Parish 2000. 
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3.3. RESEARCH VARIABLES 
3.3.1. Independent Variables 
The survey data obtained provide several objective indicators of respondents’ 
demographic information (gender, age), social-economic capital (occupation, income), human 
and political capital (education, party membership), as well as societal and material conditions 
(locale/region, etc).   
Occupational Stratum 
I use occupation as the major index to delineate the patterns of social stratification 
because it is considered to be the most accurate and objective.  To some extent, it is one of the 
most important indicators of who gains and who loses in the reform era of China.  To classify 
respondents according to their occupations, I employ the seven categories listed in Table 1.  The 
categories form a hierarchy in terms of skill, responsibility and complexity of the occupational 
function or role in the whole society.  Each category is converted into a dummy variable, so that 
the score of value or attitude change can be interpreted with percentage change.  Among all 
categories, state administrator, state-owned enterprise (SOE) manager and private business 
owner/manager are at the highest layer of the entire hierarchy8, followed by professional and 
clerical worker9 at the middle layer, and sales/service worker and old industry worker at the 
lowest layer.  Such a categorical scale helps to indicate an individual’s relative placement and 
positional power in the stratification hierarchy of the society.   
                                                 
8 In generally, the assumption is that the state administrators and the SOE managers have the highest redistributive 
power, while the private business owners/managers have the highest market power in Chinese urban society. 
9 “Clerical worker” sometimes is called “semi-professional” or “white collar” in the literature of occupational 
classification. 
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Table 1   Occupational Stratification in the 1992 Urban Survey 
Occupational Stratum Frequency Percent (%)
State Administrator 180 8.48
SOE Manager 152 7.16
Private Business Owner/Manager (including getihu) 45 2.12
Professional 252 11.88
Clerical Worker 522 24.60
Sales/Service Worker 107 5.04
Old Industry Worker 864 40.72
Total 2122 100.00
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
 
Gender (Male) 
I use a dummy variable (male=1) to examine gender-based variations.   
Age Groups 
Age is divided into six sub-groups by the year when the respondent reaches twenty years 
old.  Respectively, they are group “before 49,” group “49-65,” group “66-76,” group “77-84,” 
group “85-92,” and group “after 92.”  For example, group “before 49” means the respondent had 
reached twenty years old by 1949, and “after 92” means the respondent hadn’t reached twenty 
years old when the survey was done in 1992.  All the age groups are converted into dummy 
variables.   
Party Membership 
I use a dummy variable (party membership=1) to indicate the Chinese Communist Party 
(CCP) membership as a measure of political capital.   
Education Years/10 
I use the years of formal education as a measure of human capital in market societies.  It 
is measured by the respondents’ total years of formal education divided by 10.   
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Family Income per capita 
Income is measured by the respondents’ family income per capita, including bonus and 
fringe benefits.  I convert it into a 0-1 scale. 
Control Variables 
I include a set of control variables to indicate respondents’ regional (city) characteristics 
in all analyses to control for regional-specific variations.  The control variables include 
locale/region10, city annual income growth rate, city population/1000, weak ties to neighbors, 
and proportion of city income generated by expanding light industries and service sectors (as 
opposed to old, state-owned, heavy industries).   
3.3.2. Intermediate Variables 
In this thesis I introduce “class identification” and “perceived class tension” to the 
regression models as intermediate explanatory variables.  They are considered as intermediate 
factors since they are expected to be affected by the independent variables on the one hand 
(Hypotheses 1, 2), and they are also expected to influence people’s various values and behaviors 
as dependent variables on the other hand (Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6).   Moreover, Hypothesis 3 
tests the causal relationship between the two intermediate variables. 
Class Identification 
Class identification is broadly synonymous with class awareness.  It is about the feeling 
of belongingness to a distinct class, which is a prerequisite condition for class consciousness of 
that particular class as a unified group in tension with other classes.  In the 1992 survey, the 
                                                 
10 In this analysis, there are six regions in total, each of which is a combination of several adjacent cities. The 
regions are Northeastern Region, North Central Region, Central Region, Yangtze Delta Region, Lingnan Region, 
and Southwestern Region. They are all converted into dummy variables. 
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question to measure class identification is: (65) “If people in the society can be classified into 
different social classes, which class do you think you belong to? a) upper class, b) upper middle 
class, c) middle class, d) lower middle class, e) lower class.” 
The results from the descriptive analysis are shown in Table 2.  Surprisingly, 45.63% of 
the respondents identify themselves with middle class, 35.56% with lower middle class, and 
5.33% with upper middle class.  These three self-identified classes constitute about 86.52% of 
the total sample, which infers that urban Chinese people have very strong sense of middle class 
identification.  The same pattern of class identification is found in each occupational stratum.  
This result actually shows quite a difference compared with the Western early capitalist 
experience11.  There are three potential reasons for such a high middle class identification 
among urban Chinese people.  First, under state socialist system in Mao’s era, the government 
asserted that the ideal model of class structure was “two classes, one stratum” (liang jieji, yi 
jieceng), in which state administrators, SOE managers, professionals, industry workers, and so 
on were all considered as working class.  Therefore, even though the market transition brought in 
a set of different ideologies and values, and gave birth to the reemergence of several classes, 
people are still not quite familiar with those class labels and “middle class” seems to be the one 
which fit the old egalitarian ideologies best.  Second, as we know, the 1992 survey is an urban 
survey, excluding the rural population.  Thus, urban people are less likely to identify themselves 
as lower class if they compare with their rural counterparts.  Third, the influence of 
Confucianism is still going on generation by generation.  Therefore, Chinese people are used to 
                                                 
11 A similar survey conducted in America in 1945 by the Princeton University had the results as following: nearly 
three-quarters of all business, intellectuals and clerical workers identify themselves with middle class or upper class. 
On the other hand, an even larger proportion of all manual workers (79%) identify themselves with working and 
lower class (Centers 1949). 
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choose the “middle way” in the public, which possibly explains why respondents hesitated to 
choose “upper” or “lower” classes. 
Due to such a high middle class identification found in the survey, instead of using class 
identification in a general manner, I introduce the variable “middle class identification” based on 
the above descriptive results (also see Table 2 for details).  It is a 0-1 scaled variable, for which 1 
indicates that the respondent identifies himself or herself with middle class, 0.5 indicates upper 
middle class or lower middle class identification, and 0 indicates lower class identification12.     
 
Table 2   Class Identification by Occupational Stratum (%) 
  
State 
Administrator 
SOE 
Manager 
Private 
Business 
Owner/Manager Professional
Clerical 
Worker 
Sales/Service 
Worker 
Old 
Industry 
Worker Total 
Upper 
Class 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.81 0.00 1.92 0.59 0.58
Upper 
Middle 
Class 6.99 2.67 8.89 11.29 0.00 4.81 2.84 5.33
Middle 
Class 48.33 46.67 51.11 51.61 51.43 55.77 39.81 45.63
Lower 
Middle 
Class 35.41 37.33 31.11 29.84 34.29 23.08 38.86 35.56
Lower 
Class 8.81 13.33 8.89 6.45 14.29 14.42 17.89 12.91
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China   
 
                                                 
12 To better test the hypotheses, I code the upper class identification as missing for the variable “middle class 
identification”, provided its frequency is considerably small (only 13 respondents out of 2180). 
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Perceived Class Tension 
In this thesis, the “perceived class tension” is derived from a series of questions 
measuring sympathies and antipathies of people from different classes, the indices on who gets 
too much paid and who does not get enough, which reveal some socially significant trends.  The 
question asks: (107-116) “What do you think about the income of the following categories of 
people: peasants; workers; people working in sales or service sectors; SOE managers; state 
administrators; teachers; scientists and technologists; other intellectuals; private business 
owners/managers, including getihu13; employees of private businesses?” The answers include: a) 
too high, b) somewhat high, c) just right, d) somewhat low, e) too low, f) don’t know.   
The results of the descriptive analysis are shown in Appendix A.  All the seven 
occupational strata of people believe the private business owners/managers are the most over-
paid, and all of them think old industry workers are the most under-paid.  This indicates people’s 
sympathy towards old industry workers and antipathy towards the private business 
owners/managers, which further suggests more or less the perception of tension between these 
two groups.  Thinking in the Marxian framework, tension between classes is generated from the 
deprivation of one group by the other, especially the deprivation of working class by capitalist 
class in terms of relative remuneration.  Indeed, in urban areas, it is widely believed that old 
industry workers are among the groups who heavily lose from the reforms, while the private 
business owners/managers are among the winners of the reforms.  Old industry workers not only 
lose economically, but also politically.  They used to be officially recognized as a “leading class” 
(lingdao jieji) and were highly protected by the state in Mao’ era, but they have no longer been 
favored by the income and welfare policies and their political status have been eroded since the 
reforms (Bian 2002).  On the other hand, the private businesses have thrived and the income of 
                                                 
13 Small business owners/managers who employ less than 10 workers, for example, mom-and-pop shop owners.  
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the private business owners/managers has been getting increasingly higher over the last two 
decades.  Therefore, I create a 0-1 variable called “perceived class tension” to measure people’s 
perception of the tension just between private business owners/managers and old industry 
workers14, in which 1 means the highest perceived tension between the two groups and 0 means 
the lowest. 
3.3.3. Dependent Variables15 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 6 test the impacts of the independent and intermediate variables on 
the dependent variables, containing peoples’ various values, beliefs, and behaviors.  To test 
Hypothesis 4, I use four dependent variables (economic efficacy, ability, exertion, and 
connection to bureaucrats) to measure the “attributions of social inequality.”   For Hypothesis 
616, I introduce four dependent variables (reform support, fairness, hopefulness, and monetary 
acquisitiveness) to indicate the “response to the reform and feeling of fairness.”  Finally, to test 
Hypothesis 5, I use five dependent variables (political efficacy, political activism, psychological 
involvement, and attention to public media) to measure the “political participation and interest 
articulation.” 
 
                                                 
14 Since there are seven occupational groups in this analysis, it would be extremely complicated to examine the 
perceived tension between every two groups. Hence, I only examine the perceived tension between the private 
business owners/managers and old industry workers, since all respondents perceive that the tension between these 
two groups is the largest. 
15  For the dependent variables, I borrow the measurements for “economic efficacy”, “reform support”, 
“hopefulness”, “monetary acquisitiveness”, “political efficacy”, “political activism” from Tang and Parish (2000).  
16 I test Hypothesis 6 before Hypothesis 5 intentionally, since I want to examine people’s attitudinal response to the 
reform before examining their political activist values. 
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3.3.3.1. Attributions of Social Inequality 
Economic Efficacy 
“Economic efficacy” scale includes four questions about whether one can gain success 
through his or her own individual effort without assistance from family, social connections, or 
other social factors.  It is a summary scale to examine the attributions of social and economic 
success at the individual level and social inequality at the societal level.  These survey questions 
are: (66) “One only needs to be willing to exert oneself17 and then one will surely succeed.” (70) 
“If one wants to become a leader, then one must have a very good family background.” The 
implication of “good family background” is to be born in a high-status family with good social 
connections.  This item enters into the summary scale in a reverse direction from the other items.  
(76) “In your opinion, under current conditions, one’s income lags behind others is mainly 
because of: a) laziness, b) bad luck, c) inability, d) bad fate, e) social injustice, f) risk 
adverseness, g) poor education, h) bad family background, i) poor health, j) disinterest in money, 
k) bad character, l) poor money management, m) fear of losing face, n) others.  Responses of a, 
c, f, g, I, j, k, l, m are coded as 1 for high on personal responsibility, and the rest are coded as 0 
for low in personal responsibility.  (100) “In your opinion, if one wants to succeed nowadays, it 
depends mostly on: a) willingness to take risks, b) scholarship, c) ability, d) willingness to exert 
oneself, e) willingness to manipulate others, f) family background, g) good at making friends 
with all kinds of people, h) good at building good relations with bureaucrats, i) good at seizing 
opportunities, j) good luck, k) others.  Responses of a, b, c, d are coded as 1 for high on 
individual initiative, and the rest are coded as 0 for low on individual initiative. 
 
                                                 
17 Literally translated from Chinese language, the wording for “be willing to exert oneself” should be “be willing to 
eat bitterness” in the survey. 
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Ability 
“Ability” is generated from the response “ability” for item 100 in the survey (see detailed 
descriptions of item 100 above).  It is converted into a dummy variable and measures whether 
the respondents believe that an individual’s success depends mostly on his or her ability. 
Exertion 
“Exertion” is created from the response “willingness to exert oneself” for item 100 (see 
detailed descriptions of item 100 above).  It is converted into a dummy variable and measures 
whether the respondents think a person’s success depends mostly on his/her willingness to exert 
himself or herself, literally, “to eat bitterness.” 
Connections to Bureaucrats 
“Connections to bureaucrats” is derived from the response “good at building good 
relations with bureaucrats” for item 100 (see detailed descriptions of item 100 above).  It is 
converted into a dummy variable and measures whether the respondents consider the connections 
to the redistributive power is the most important for a person’s success. 
3.3.3.2. Feeling of Fairness and Response to the Reform  
Reform Support 
The “reform support” scale includes five agree/disagree statements that question whether 
people view life as improved or not under reforms.  This “reform support” scale is different from 
the “hopefulness” scale, which I will illustrate later, because the former asks questions more 
about how well the government is doing while the latter asks questions more about how well the 
individual respondent is doing under reforms.  The five statements include (95) “Society is 
changing too fast now.  Life is much more difficult than before reform,” (96) “Reform has 
caused changes in many aspects of life, which gives people a lot more opportunities to develop 
themselves,” (97) “Reform has caused many things to get worse.  It is not as good as the past 
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when everyone was about the same, going to work to get a salary without worry,” (98) 
“Regardless of how society changes, I am confident that I will never end up on the bottom rung 
compared with others,” (99) “There are more and more people in the society who do not respect 
the rules today.” Items 96 and 98 enter into the summary scale with negative loadings compared 
with the other items in the scale.   
Fairness 
“Fairness” is based on two questions in the survey.  One is about one’s feeling about 
career fairness: (105) “Are your career achievements reasonable or fair?” The other question is 
about one’s feeling about income fairness: (106) “Is your income reasonable or fair with regard 
to your ability?”  
Hopefulness 
“Hopefulness” is about one’s personal and psychological situation.  It asks how the 
reforms affect the respondents in terms of their mental well-being and optimism.  It includes five 
agree/disagree statements from the survey.  It is the inverse of a normal anomie scale, which 
indicates a loss of old values and rules to live with in a changing society.  The five statements are 
(92) “People’s thoughts are constantly changing.  One really does not know what one can hold 
on to,” (93) “With so many decisions to be made in life, sometimes one really does not know 
what one should do,” (94) “Life is really meaningless,” (95) “Society is changing too fast now.  
Life is much more difficult than before reform,” (96) “Reform has caused changes in many 
aspects of life, giving people a lot more opportunities to develop themselves.”  
Monetary Acquisitiveness 
I use a seven-statement summary scale to measure whether one highly values money and 
its acquisition or not.  It includes statements: (67) “As long as one does not steal or kill, any 
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means of making money is fine.” (68) “Work is merely for earning money to get by.” (71) 
“Money is the only thing one needs to gain respect from others, and it makes no difference how 
one got the money.” (72) “Generally speaking, tranquility alone is wealth.  One does not need be 
too concerned about fortune, fame, or success.” (75) “Individual’s money acquisition is always 
beneficial to the society.” (77) “Two people, A and B, are looking for jobs.  A is looking for a 
job with prestige but not so highly paid.  B is looking for a job lacking prestige but with pay 
twice as high.  If it were you, which job would you like to choose?” (79) “There are three people, 
A, B, and C.  A says the more money the better.  Moreover if A got a lot of money, A would not 
work anymore.  B says money is not a good thing.  Having a lot of money is pointless.  C says 
one can not get by without money, but one just needs a little to get by.  Which manner of 
speaking do you most agree with?” Due to the opposite direction of their wordings, items 72 and 
77 enter into the summary scale with weighted reverse direction from the other items. 
3.3.3.3. Political Participation and Interest Articulation 
Political Efficacy 
“Political efficacy” is a summary scale derived from two statements: (133) “If one often 
voices opinions, [even] people like us can influence society’s developments,” (134) “Ordinary 
citizens can also influence government policy making.” 
Political Activism 
Three questions in the survey are used to measure “political activism,” which asks 
whether people would or did raise issues and make suggestions in society and/or at work.  A 
factor analysis nicely categorizes the three questions into one factor, which I name as “political 
activism.”  The first question is about the degree of one’s political participation in civic society: 
(120) “What would you do if something happened that hurts everyone’s interest at work or in 
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your neighborhood? Would you a) lead a petition to relevant government offices and officials, b) 
lead a petition if being asked, c) follow the crowd rather than leading, or d) avoid troubles?” The 
second question is about one’s disobedience: (123) “What would you do if your supervisor made 
a wrong decision related to work? Would you a) obey, b) silently disobey, or c) tell the 
supervisor he or she was wrong.”  The third question is about one’s participation in workplace 
decision making: (124) “In recent years, have you made suggestions or expressed your opinions 
on workplace reform, innovation, or improvement of management? a) yes, often, b) sometimes, c) 
only when being asked, d) only talked to friends or colleagues about it, or e)never.”   
Psychological Involvement 
One question in the survey is used to measure individual’s level of interest in politics and 
frequency of discussing politics with friends — “psychological involvement.”  The question is: 
(125) “How often do you discuss with others about China’s reforms and important political 
events?” The answers include a) often, b) sometimes, c) rarely, d) never. 
Attention to Public Media 
One item is employed to tap the level of one’s attention to public media: (121) “How 
often do you read newspapers or magazines, watch television, or listen to radio?” The answers 
include a) often, b) twice or three times a week, c) rarely, d) never. 
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4. FINDINGS18 
4.1. FINDING I 
By testing Hypothesis 1, this section explores the causal antecedents of people’s class 
identification in contemporary urban China.  Since I specify the intermediate variable “class 
identification” as “middle class identification,” the Hypothesis 1 is revised correspondingly as: 
Hypothesis 1’: The groups who gain from the reforms are more likely to identify themselves with 
middle class than the groups who lose from the reforms. 
In order to explore the causal factors of middle class identification, I run a multivariate 
regression of “middle class identification” on all the independent and control variables.  Based 
on the results presented in Appendix B, gender has a statistically significant and negative 
influence on middle class identification.  Interestingly, women are more likely to identify 
themselves with middle class than men do.  About the age groups, the impact of group 66-76 on 
middle class identification does not have statistically significant difference from that of the 
reference group 49-65, while other groups are more likely to identify themselves with middle 
class than group 49-65 and group 66-76.  The implication is that people who grew up during the 
Mao era (1949 – 1976) tend to identify themselves in a more “humble” way.  It may be very 
sensitive for these people to reveal their real social status even if they should belong to middle 
                                                 
18 The structure of the explanatory regression models and all variables used are shown in Appendix D. 
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class according to the objective occupational stratification.  Both education and income have 
statistically significant and positive impacts on middle class identification, which is quite 
intuitive as the more educated or the richer tent to have relatively higher self-prestige.  
Surprisingly, communist party membership does not have statistically significant influence on 
middle class identification, possibly because party members have been losing their former 
privileges solely determined by their right political proclivities.   
As for the occupational strata, compared with old industry workers, state administrator, 
SOE managers, and professionals all show statistically significant and positive impacts on 
middle class identification; while private business owners/managers, clerical workers, and 
sales/service workers all exhibit no significant difference from old industry workers in terms of 
their impacts on middle class identification.  The regression results are somewhat opposite to 
Hypothesis 1.  Although private business owners/managers are closer to the market and have 
been doing well since the second decade of market reforms especially after Deng’s southern trip 
in 1992 – right before this survey was conducted, they were still looked down upon in earlier 
days of reforms due to low status of private business as compared with state-owned business 
during the state socialist period.  Therefore, they still tended to identify themselves with lower 
class in the early 1990s, although they have acquired more freedom in the market and been 
widely considered as the winners of the reforms.  The results for state administrators and SOE 
managers are significant, which do not support our hypothesis, because the “market transition” 
theory suggests that as the transition from a redistributive economy to a market economy, the old 
administrative and work unit advantages will fade.  In some sense, the results are consistent with 
the “power persistence” theory proposed by Bian and Logan (1996), in which they argue that the 
market reforms allow multiple winners, including old administrative redistributors and new 
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managerial and entrepreneurial producers.  In other words, existing redistributors can still 
maintain their privilege and secure their benefits through the conversion of their political and 
social capitals to other capitals.  As for professionals, they may not be the direct beneficiaries of 
the open market.  As late as 1992, before the 1993 wage reforms, professionals remain very 
unhappy with their incomes (Tang and Parish 2000).  However, they possess high self-prestige 
and social status; therefore, they still tend to consider themselves as higher classes compared 
with old industry workers.   
4.2. FINDING II 
This section explores the causal antecedents of people’s perceived class tension in urban 
Chinese society.  Since I specify this intermediate variable as perceived tension between private 
business owners/managers and old industry workers, Hypothesis 2 is revised correspondingly as: 
Hypothesis 2’: The groups who gain from the reforms perceive less tension between private 
business owners/managers and old industry workers than the groups who lose from the reforms. 
Correspondingly, I revise Hypothesis 3 as: 
Hypothesis 3’: The groups who are more likely to identify themselves with middle class perceive 
less tension between private business owners/managers and old industry workers than the 
groups who are less likely to identify themselves with middle class. 
In order to explore the causal relationships, I run a multivariate regression of “perceived 
class tension” on all the independent and control variables.  Moreover, to test out Hypothesis 3’, 
I also include “middle class identification” as one of the independent variables in the regression 
model.   
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The regression results are shown in Appendix B.  Gender, education, and income do not 
have significant impact on perceived class tension.  Party membership does have significant 
impact on perceived class tension.  As stated in Finding I, party membership seems no longer as 
an important indicator of right political orientations and high social positions as in the pre-reform 
period.  A large number of party members who lose their privileges may have difficulty 
accepting the new order of the market, so tend to recognize the tension between the so-called 
winners and losers of the reforms.  As for age groups, compared with group before 49, all other 
groups have significant and positive effects on perceived class tension.  In other words, people 
grown up after the foundation of the People’s Republic of China are more likely to perceive class 
tension than people of earlier generations.  This is probably because that, people who grown up 
after 1949, especially before the market reforms, were overwhelmed by the terms “class,”  “class 
struggle” and “class conflict” all the time, and this class-intensified ideology may be passed over 
generation by generation even during the reform era today.    
Regarding the influences of occupational strata, compared with the reference group − 
professionals, SOE managers and old industry workers have significant and positive impacts on 
perceived class tension, while all other groups do not exhibit significant difference from 
professionals.  This is somewhat understandable.  During the market transitional period, old 
industry workers are among the groups who lose from reforms.  Many of them have lost their 
“iron-bowls” and their “leading class” status, been laid off without any income and proper 
compensation, and even witnessed the bankruptcies of the SOEs where they have worked for 
decades.  Meanwhile, private businesses have become more and more thriving and people 
working in private businesses have been improving their living standard successfully.  Hence it 
is not so surprising for old industry workers to perceive class tension.  As for the SOE managers, 
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they have faced the massive layoff of old industry workers, most of whom were the former 
employees of SOEs.  Also, realizing the increasing competitions in the market, particularly since 
the second decade of the reforms, SOE managers tend to see the prospering private businesses as 
their business contesters.  Therefore, showing sympathy towards their former employees while 
antipathy towards their potential enemies, SOE managers tend to recognize the tension between 
these two groups.   
For Hypothesis 3’, the result suggests that middle class identification has statistically 
significant and negative influence on perceived class tension, which supports our hypothesis.  
This means that people who tend to identify themselves with middle class are less likely to 
perceive tension between private business owners/managers and old industry workers.  This 
result shows the mediating role of middle class identification in Chinese urban society.  It is 
widely believed in the West that middle class as an important social component serves to 
stabilize the society.  However, it is interesting to find that in Chinese society, with the 
discrepancy between objective social stratification and people subjective class affiliation, the 
latter is more important than the former to suppress their awareness of class tension and to 
stabilize the society.  It may be inappropriate to say that Chinese people suffer from “false 
identification” or even “false consciousness,” but their “identification” to some extent does keep 
them away from the perception of class tension19. 
                                                 
19 The results confirm the findings of a survey conducted by Li (2005). 
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4.3. FINDING III 
In the following sections, I use “middle class identification” and “perceived class 
tension” as explanatory variables to test the remaining hypotheses.  The revised Hypothesis 4 is: 
Hypothesis 4’: The groups who are more likely to perceive tension between private business 
owners/managers and old industry workers or who are less likely to identify themselves with 
middle class are less likely to attribute personal success to individual effort. 
In order to explore the causal relationships, I run a multivariate regression of a set of 
dependent variables – “economic efficacy,” “ability,” “exertion,” and “connection” − on the two 
intermediate variables and all other independent and control variables.  The results in Appendix 
C.1. show that “perceived class tension” has significant and negative impact on “efficacy,” 
“ability,” “exertion,” and significant and positive influence on “connection.”  In other words, 
people who are more likely to perceive class tension tend to believe that one could get ahead by 
his/her social connection to bureaucrats, rather than by his/her own effort, including ability, 
willingness to exert, etc.  These results contradict with the prediction by the “market transition” 
theory, while confirm the power persistent theory.  As the market transition goes on, the 
redistributive power does not necessarily step down for the market power.  On the contrary, 
people who perceive class tension tend to feel that bureaucrats still hold great redistributive 
power and private businessmen who have connection to bureaucrats are more likely to get 
resources and run business successfully.  Some “insiders” of the system even use their power or 
privilege to transform themselves into capitalist owners/managers of semi-state, collective, or 
private properties.  These results are also consistent with the observations of some scholars.  For 
example, Wank (1999) notes that patron-client ties with government officials are the hallmark of 
private businessmen in Xiamen.   
 35
“Middle class identification” has statistically significant and positive impact on 
“economic efficacy,” “ability,” “exertion,” and significant and negative influence on 
“connection.”  That means people who tend to identify themselves with middle class are more 
likely to attribute a person’s success to his/her individual effort.  As discussed, state 
administrators, SOE managers and professionals, the multiple winners of the reforms, are the 
three groups who are most likely to identify themselves with middle class.  No matter how they 
gain the benefits from the reforms or maintain their power, they tend to glorify their success by 
attributing it to their individual effort rather than their persistent power or connection to 
bureaucrats.    
4.4. FINDING IV 
This section studies people’s feeling of fairness of the social system and satisfaction of 
the reforms by testing the following revised hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 6’: The groups who are more likely to perceive tension between private business 
owners/managers and old industry workers or who are less likely to  identify themselves with 
middle class are less likely to possess feeling of fairness of the social system and satisfaction of 
the reforms.   
In order to explore the causal relationships, I run a multivariate regression of a set of 
dependent variables – “fairness,” “hopefulness,” “reform support” and “monetary 
acquisitiveness,” on the two intermediate variables and all other independent and control 
variables.  The results in Appendix C.2. show that “perceived class tension” has significant and 
negative influence on all the four dependent variables, which confirms Hypothesis 6’.  That 
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means people who tend to perceive class tension are more likely to feel hopelessness about 
his/her personal situation, to feel dissatisfied with the reforms, to feel unfairness of the social 
system, and to long for the traditional communal egalitarianism rather than the market 
acquisitiveness.  In other words, the one who perceives class tension seems somewhat 
pessimistic about the market reforms.  As discussed, people who are more likely to perceive 
class tension are usually those who lose from the reform, such as old industry workers.  The 
wholesale transformation of distributive system leads to their loss in social status and even basic 
livelihood.  After decades of socialization with the socialist egalitarian values, it is not surprising 
to find that they have difficulty accepting the legitimacy of the new social order in which market-
based individualist and acquisitive values have become favored.  Moreover, they are more likely 
to blame the unfairness of the new system and complain about the market reforms. 
“Middle class identification” has significant and positive impact on all the four dependent 
variables, which also supports Hypothesis 6’.  That means people who believe themselves as 
middle class tend to feel optimistic about his/her personal situation, to feel satisfied with the 
reforms and the market acquisitive value, and to perceive fairness of the social system.  As we 
know, the groups who identify themselves with middle class are among those elites in Chinese 
urban society, who are supposed to be more confident about their performance and status in the 
society.  They tend to believe that regardless of how society changes, they will never end up on 
the bottom rung of the social ladder compared with others.  Therefore, it makes sense for them to 
be optimistic about the reforms and adopt various market values.  Moreover, these results further 
confirm the role of middle class identification to stabilize society and mediate negative 
consequences resulting from social tension. 
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4.5. FINDING V 
This section examines people’s political participation and interest articulation by testing 
the following revised hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5’: The groups who are more likely to perceive tension between private business 
owners/managers and old industry workers or who are less likely to identify themselves with 
middle class tend to hold certain political participatory values and attitudes. 
In order to explore the causal relationship, I run a multivariate regression of a set of 
dependent variables: “political activism,” “political efficacy,” “attention to public media,” 
“psychological involvement,” on the two intermediate variables and all other independent and 
control variables.  The results (see Appendix C.3.) for “middle class identification” are similar 
with the previous findings.  It has significant and positive influence on “political activism,” 
“political efficacy,” “psychological involvement,” and no significant impact on “attention to 
public media.”  That means people who identify themselves with middle class are more likely to 
physically participate in political activities, psychologically get involved in political issues, and 
believe their influence on political decision-making process.  As discussed, people having middle 
class identification are among the elites of Chinese urban society, and many of them are either 
direct redistributors or consultants for redistributors.  Hence, they inevitably get involved in 
shaping political decisions either physically or psychologically.  Moreover, it once again 
supports the mediating role of middle class identification.  In this case, middle class 
identification also promotes political activism, political efficacy and psychological involvement, 
which are important prerequisites for the progress of democratization.   
The results for “perceived class tension” seem quite interesting.  It has significant and 
positive effect on “attention to public media,” “psychological involvement,” significant and 
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negative effect on “political efficacy,” and no significant effect on “political activism.”  That 
means perceiving class tension does promote people’s attention to public media, psychological 
involvement in politics, but it induces them to disbelieve they could influence the decision-
making process.  Moreover, it does not lead to people’s interest in participation in political 
activities.  On the one hand, those perceiving class tension are among groups who are most 
vulnerable and unprotected in urban society, hence they are eager to improve their status and 
welfare, they pay much attention to what is going on in public media, they want to get involved 
in discussing politics to exchange more information, and they expect to find some way to make 
themselves better off.  On the other hand, due to their disadvantageous social status and 
disconnection to neither market power nor old redistributive power, they are precluded from 
decision-making process in reality and also in their psyche.  Therefore, they exhibit little belief 
in political efficacy and they do not think they have political influence.  There is sign indicating 
their psychological involvement in politics, while in practice there is little sign indicating their 
active participation into political activities.  In other words, even though they are upset about 
their situation during the reform era, such discontent does not automatically or easily get 
translated into certain political activities or movements that could dismantle the social order or 
threaten the regime stability. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Although the survey results reported in this thesis alone cannot provide a definitive 
picture of the patterns of social classes and class tension in urban China, they shed some light on 
the two puzzles presented in the introduction section and make some contributions for future 
research to build on.   
Now let us return to the two puzzles proposed earlier in this thesis: the persistence of 
non-democratic institutions despite the robust economic development, and the regime stability 
despite the increasing social inequality.  The “market transition” theory argues that as economic 
reforms go on, the direct producers (e.g., private entrepreneurs) will gain more and more 
bargaining power than the old redistributors (e.g., state administrators), and the direct producers 
will inevitably push the society toward further reforms, wide opening to the outside world, and 
expansion of civil society and democratization (So 2003).  However, this thesis challenges the 
predictions of the “market transition” theory.  The findings seem more consistent with the 
“power persistence” theory argued by Bian and Logan (1996), which suggests that market 
reforms allow multiple winners.  On the one hand, the direct producers who are closer to the 
market are gaining more bargaining power through the reforms.  On the other hand, the state 
redistributors and SOE managers continue to enjoy great control over political and economic 
resources and they use these resources to secure the benefits for themselves.   
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This thesis confirms such arguments through empirical investigations and I use class 
analysis approach to examine people’s psychological incentive of pushing democratization 
process.  From the top, state administrators and SOE managers are among the beneficiaries of the 
reforms, they are still enjoying their high social status and bargaining power through using their 
political and social capitals, and they are more likely to hold positive attitudes toward the system 
and the reforms.  Hence, they are less likely to initiate political reforms since they may lose their 
control power during the democratization process.  For the direct producers such as private 
business owners/managers, it is widely believed that they gain their success not through their 
talent, ability, entrepreneurship, hard work or other individual effort, but through their 
connections or patron-client ties with bureaucrats and redistributive power.  In other words, 
although they are getting stronger economically, they are still weak politically.  Thus, as the 
group who are supposed to push for political reforms predicted by the “market transition” theory, 
they have neither incentive nor capability to do so since the connection to the old redistributive 
power is crucially important for their economic performance.  From the bottom, the 
transformation of the system necessarily produced large number of losers such as old industry 
workers.  Although they do have strong perceptions of unfairness and injustice, their unrest and 
discontent are not easily translated into political actions.  Their disadvantageous positions 
promote their psychological involvement in political issues and their attention to public media, 
but they do not believe that they have any say to change the status quo.  Furthermore, my 
empirical findings suggest that Chinese people’s high middle class identification also help to 
explain the lack of actions.  De-empowered people’s self-identified classes are inconsistent with 
their objective social strata, probably due to the influence of the remaining socialist ideology.  
They are not fully aware of the “inequality” they are experiencing and they do not realize that 
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they are becoming the real “proletarians” or non-owners.  They still seem to enjoy their 
perceived high social status, though they do get hurt economically.  Hence, their awareness is not 
adequate to transform their “class in itself” to “class for itself” per se, and their incentive and 
power to push the political reforms and democratization is far from enough.  In short, from the 
1992 urban survey, we see little sign for social movements or rebellions that aim in threatening 
the political regime and social stability.   
However, this thesis has a weakness that makes my findings not conclusive enough.  
Considering the research questions and the two puzzles I want to address, using 1992 urban 
survey data alone is not adequate to deal with the problems in an updated and comprehensive 
manner.  In my subsequent research, I would like to use more current national survey data, 
covering both urban and rural areas, to conduct a longitudinal study.  Without doing this, it may 
be too arbitrary to conclude that China could maintain its non-democratic institutions and social 
stability under rapid economic development and widening income gap.  And there is no ground 
for us to answer whether “Chinese society really resembles a volcano on the verge of eruption.”   
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APPENDIX A 
Perceived Class Tension by Occupational Stratum 
    Respondent’s Occupational Stratum 
    
State 
Administrator 
SOE 
Manager
Private 
Business 
Owner/Manager Professional
Clerical 
Worker 
Sales/Service 
Worker 
Old 
Industry 
Worker 
State 
Administrators 6.56 12.40 27.14 8.37 20.83 18.18 23.88
SOE Managers 21.91 17.72 25.00 22.52 26.92 27.22 28.11
Private Business 
Owners/Managers 
(PBOM) 
68.24 66.00 32.05 66.19 57.41 67.98 67.97
Professionals 3.85 4.13 7.81 0.27 6.52 9.70 11.52
Clerical Workers 28.47 28.39 9.09 27.72 24.07 27.98 26.34
Sales/Service 
Workers 14.37 12.30 14.29 18.84 14.81 7.98 14.52
Attitude 
toward 
the 
Income 
of  
Old Industry 
Workers (OIW) 1.89 0.35 1.28 2.79 3.45 1.55 0.94
Major Tension is Perceived 
between OIW — PBOM 
OIW — 
PBOM OIW — PBOM 
OIW — 
PBOM 
OIW 
— 
PBOM 
OIW — 
PBOM 
OIW — 
PBOM 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China   
Note: In order to calculate respondents' perceived tension among the seven groups of people, I assign a value from 0-1 for each response to 
the question “What do you think about the income of the following categories of people: peasants; workers; people working in sales or 
service sections; SOE managers; state administrators; teachers; scientists and technologists; other intellectuals; private business owners or 
managers, including getihu; employees of private business?” In particular, the response “too high” is assigned 1, “somewhat high” is 
assigned 0.5, and “just right,” “somewhat low” “too low” are assigned 0.  Then I calculate a weighted average (0-100 scaled) of each 
respondent.  The higher in the scale, the more negative attitude toward this group of people; the lower in the scale, the more positive 
attitude toward this group of people.   
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APPENDIX B 
Models for Middle Class Identification and Perceived Class Tension (OLS) 
  Middle Class Identification Perceived Class Tension 
Middle Class Identification  -0.084* 
state adminstrator 0.064* 0.007 
SOE manager 0.070* 0.113* 
private business owner/manager 0.067 0.032 
professional 0.072* cf. 
clerical worker 0.055 0.004 
sales/service worker 0.048 0.034 
old industry worker cf. 0.089* 
before49 0.109* cf. 
g4965 cf. 0.104* 
g6676 -0.007 0.160* 
g7784 0.048* 0.152* 
g8592 0.067* 0.165* 
after92 0.161* 0.120* 
male -0.114* 0.015 
education years/10 0.050# 0.010 
party membership 0.000 0.038# 
family income, per capita (0-1) 0.408* -0.047 
North Central Region  -0.002 -0.010 
Central Region 0.023 0.008 
Yangzi Delta Region 0.057# -0.006 
Lingnan Region -0.005 -0.050 
Southwest Region 0.086* -0.038 
Northeast Region cf. cf. 
city income growth 0.486* 0.064 
city light industry/services                        
(% of GNP, logged)  -0.002* 0.003* 
city population/1000 (logged) 0.000* 0.000 
city weak neighbor ties (index) 0.044* 0.028* 
Constant 0.488* 0.374* 
Adj. R2 0.086 0.041 
N 2250 2057 
 
cf.: Comparison group; *: p<.05; #: p<.10. 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
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APPENDIX C.1 
Models for Attributions of Social Inequality (OLS) 
  Economic Efficacy Ability Exertion 
Connection to 
Bureaucrats 
Perceived Class Tension -0.062* -0.100* -0.027# 0.075* 
Middle Class Identification 0.101* 0.047# 0.036* -0.068* 
state adminstrator -0.007 0.037 -0.038* 0.020 
SOE manager 0.019 0.092* -0.028 -0.030 
private business owner/manager 0.089* 0.208* -0.039 -0.020 
professional -0.085* 0.050 -0.068* 0.067* 
clerical worker -0.029 0.028 -0.053 -0.031 
sales/service worker 0.000 -0.003 -0.001 0.000 
old industry worker (cf.)     
before49 0.209* 0.090* 0.064* -0.085* 
g4965 0.098* 0.041 0.042* -0.015 
g6676 (cf.)     
g7784 0.007 -0.029 -0.009 -0.020 
g8592 0.000 0.100* -0.051* -0.055* 
after92 0.101* 0.131* -0.028 -0.058# 
male 0.018# 0.028 -0.007 -0.035* 
education years/10 -0.091* -0.018 -0.126* -0.007 
party membership -0.012 0.012 -0.019 0.028# 
family income, per capita (0-1) 0.046 0.000 -0.023 -0.090 
North Central Region 0.010 0.030 0.023 -0.082* 
Central Region -0.030# 0.087* 0.008 -0.083* 
Yangzi Delta Region -0.011 -0.054# -0.006 -0.056# 
Lingnan Region 0.025 -0.080# 0.095* -0.113* 
Southwest Region 0.006 -0.128* 0.099* -0.103# 
Northeast Region (cf.)     
city income growth 0.197 0.921* 0.014 -0.269 
city light industry/services                   
(% of GNP, logged)  0.000 0.002* -0.001 -0.001 
city population/1000 (logged) 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000* 
city weak neighbor ties (index) 0.012 -0.004 0.002 -0.020* 
Constant 0.568* 0.063 0.324* 0.323* 
Adj. R2 0.148 0.026 0.070 0.040 
N 1900 2039 2039 2039 
 
cf.: Comparison group; *: p<.05; #: p<.10. 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
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APPENDIX C.2 
Models for Response to the Reforms and Feeling of Fairness (OLS) 
  Reform Support Fairness Hopefulness 
Monetary 
Acquisitiveness 
Perceived Class Tension -0.032* -0.044* -0.024* -0.024* 
Middle Class Identification 0.059* 0.098* 0.020# 0.023* 
state adminstrator 0.024* 0.004 0.041* 0.032* 
SOE manager 0.031# -0.002 0.054* 0.047* 
private business owner/manager 0.055# 0.141* 0.029 -0.029 
professional 0.011 -0.032 0.040* 0.032* 
clerical worker 0.064* 0.054 0.039 0.039# 
sales/service worker -0.015 -0.007 -0.027 -0.005 
old industry worker (cf.)     
before49 0.045* 0.145* 0.048* 0.032* 
g4965 -0.006 0.028# 0.006 0.012 
g6676 (cf.)     
g7784 -0.004 0.026 -0.010 0.004 
g8592 0.024# 0.023 0.015 0.025* 
after92 0.038# 0.067# 0.066* 0.077* 
male 0.008 -0.018# 0.017# -0.003 
education years/10 0.032* -0.128* 0.026# 0.031* 
party membership 0.006 0.012 0.020# 0.031* 
family income, per capita (0-1) 0.105* 0.195* 0.121* 0.039 
North Central Region 0.009 0.043* 0.010 0.021* 
Central Region 0.015 0.050* 0.017 -0.008 
Yangzi Delta Region 0.030* 0.019 0.015 -0.006 
Lingnan Region 0.082* 0.050* 0.038* -0.034* 
Southwest Region 0.058* 0.011 0.019 0.005 
Northeast Region (cf.)     
city income growth 0.098 0.243# 0.306* -0.082 
city light industry/services                
(% of GNP, logged)  0.000 0.000 0.001* 0.000 
city population/1000 (logged) 0.000 0.000 0.000# 0.000 
city weak neighbor ties (index) 0.017* 0.015# 0.029* 0.013* 
Constant 0.447* 0.467* 0.267* 0.314* 
Adj. R2 0.102 0.117 0.098 0.077 
N 1495 1438 1398 2004 
 
cf.: Comparison group; *: p<.05; #: p<.10. 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
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APPENDIX C.3 
Models for Political Participation and Interest Articulation (OLS) 
  
Political 
Efficacy 
Political 
Activism 
Psychological 
Involvement 
Attention to 
Public Media 
Perceived Class Tension -0.034* -0.006 0.031* 0.034* 
Middle Class Identification 0.047* 0.078* 0.041* 0.005 
state adminstrator 0.003 0.043* 0.056* 0.050* 
SOE manager -0.014 0.051* 0.055* 0.035# 
private business owner/manager 0.079# 0.017 -0.030 0.003 
professional -0.045* -0.016 -0.003 0.027# 
clerical worker 0.037 0.012 -0.044 0.023 
sales/service worker -0.041 -0.015 0.019 0.024 
old industry worker (cf.)     
before49 0.096* 0.085* -0.032# 0.027# 
g4965 0.072* 0.034* -0.033* 0.018# 
g6676 (cf.)     
g7784 -0.010 -0.039* -0.045* -0.006 
g8592 -0.006 -0.069* -0.032# -0.025# 
after92 0.075* -0.063* -0.093* -0.077* 
male 0.010 0.032* 0.080* 0.011 
education years/10 -0.038# 0.073* 0.150* 0.098* 
party membership 0.006 0.056* 0.077* 0.009 
family income, per capita (0-1) 0.024 0.091# 0.116* 0.112* 
North Central Region -0.035* 0.037* 0.040* 0.017 
Central Region -0.025 0.019 0.010 -0.020# 
Yangzi Delta Region -0.008 0.012 0.005 0.004 
Lingnan Region -0.049* 0.017 0.012 0.007 
Southwest Region -0.054# 0.024 0.017 -0.058* 
Northeast Region (cf.)     
city income growth 0.255# 0.098 -0.235# 0.066 
city light industry/services                  
(% of GNP, logged)  0.001 -0.001* 0.000 0.000 
city population/1000 (logged) 0.000* 0.000 0.000 0.000 
city weak neighbor ties (index) 0.015# 0.052* 0.077* 0.025* 
Constant 0.354* 0.481* 0.335* 0.720* 
Adj. R2 0.054 0.134 0.182 0.091 
N 1577 1984 2046 2055 
 
cf.: Comparison group; *: p<.05; #: p<.10. 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
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APPENDIX D 
OLS Regression Models and All Variables Used 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent Variables: 
 
i) Attributions of Social 
Inequality 
Economic Efficacy 
Ability 
Exertion 
Connection to Bureaucrats 
 
ii) Response to the Reform 
and Feeling of Fairness 
Reform Support 
Fairness 
Hopefulness 
Monetary Acquisitiveness 
 
iii) Political Participation 
and Interest Articulation 
Political Efficacy 
Political Activism 
Psycho Involvement 
Attention to Public Media 
 
 
Intermediate Variables: 
 
Perceived Class Tension 
 
Independent Variables: 
 
Occupational Stratum 
 
Family Income, per cap. (0-1) 
 
Education Years/10 
 
CCP Membership  
 
Age Groups 
 
Gender (Male) 
Middle Class Identification  
Control Variables: 
 
Locale/Region 
 
City Income Growth 
 
City Population/1000 
 
City Light Industry/Services  
(% of GNP, logged) 
 
Weak Neighbor Ties (index) 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
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APPENDIX E 
Dependent Variables by Intermediate Variables “Middle Class Identification” and 
“Perceived Class Tension” (OLS coefficients)   
-0.150 -0.100 -0.050 0.000 0.050 0.100 0.150
Attention to Public Media
Psychological Involvement
Political Activism
Political Efficacy
Political Participation and Interest Articulation
Monetary Acquisitiveness
Hopefulness
Fairness
Reform Support
Response to Reform and Feeling of Fairness
Connection to Bureaucrats
Exertion
Ability
Economic Efficacy
Attributions of Social Inequality
Middle Class Identification Perceived Class Tension
 
Source: 1992 China Urban Survey by the Economic System Reform Institute of China 
Note: All coefficients are statistically significant at p<=.10.  Independent variables and control variables are 
included in the OLS regression equations but not shown (see Appendix C.3, C.4, and C.5). 
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